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 Abstract 
Thinking about ethics of development and ‘human development’ must both 
treat development in a global perspective and yet reflect on the content of 
‘human’. The paper1 explores some faces of globalization by using a gender 
perspective, in order to consider reproduction (psychological and emotional as 
well as biological) and the activities and attitudes of care that give moral 
resources for response to systemic tragedy, not only for identifying and 
understanding it. There now exist globally interconnected systems of 
vulnerability and capability, for which matching systems of human security, care 
and responsibility are needed in order to protect human dignity. The discourse 
of ‘human security’ helps here by better grounding an agenda of basic human 
needs, in an ethnography of ordinary lives rather than only an abstracted 
accounting of deficiencies or an elevated language of opportunities. It must be 
emotionally and existentially grounded too. We2 examine the potential 
contributions here of three diverse bodies of thought: the tradition of Mahayana 
Buddhism; the work of philosopher-anthropologist Ananta Giri; and feminist 
care ethics. 
 
Keywords 
Development ethics, Buddhism, care ethics, globalization, human 
development, human security, migration, vulnerability. 
                                                 
1 Our thanks for their comments go to: Dave Crocker, Steve Esquith, Helen Hintjens, 
Anna Malavisi, Mansoob Murshed, and a set of anonymous referees; and to lecture 
and seminar audiences in The Hague and East Lansing. 
2 gasper@iss.nl; truong@iss.nl 
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Development Ethics Through The Lenses Of Caring, 
Gender, And Human Security 
 1 INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZED VULNERABILITY  
Processes of globalization are diverse in character and have produced 
contradictory tendencies: integration and differentiation, spread and 
concentration, inclusion and exclusion, gain and loss. Global concentration of 
power and authority in trade and finance and economic policy – the 
dominance of bodies in Washington DC, together with the WTO and a few 
others – has been paralleled by the decline of many weaker economies into 
structural indebtedness, foreign imposed economic policy regimes (and their 
widespread failure), shrinkage of many domestically owned activities, and 
greatly increased reliance on exports such as drugs, persons and criminal 
‘services’. Globalization processes offer unprecedented opportunities, for those 
able to take them, including opportunities for more efficient exploitation and 
crime. They frequently spread inequality within as well as between countries.3 
Forms of exploitation of persons that had been largely exiled to the fringes of 
the world system have revived in the North (see e.g. Ehrenreich & Hochschild 
2003); while some countries in the South have restructured their economies 
and societies such that the sex trade and dependency on women migrants’ 
remittances have become a form of survival for both nation-states and a 
growing number of their citizens. Saskia Sassen has called this the feminization 
of survival (2002); ‘the sex trade itself has become a development strategy in 
some areas’ (Sassen 2003: 269). 4 A global trade in people has re-emerged, 
based on increasingly globalized communications and aspirations, structural 
economic problems in much of the South and East, and increasing demand yet 
decreasing local supply in rich locations for some types of labour, particularly 
of low-cost labour for menial tasks (Sassen 2003). 
Many of the most striking examples of these varied processes and 
transfers are in industrial countries, not least the implosion or decay of parts of 
the former Soviet bloc, and in the work and movements of women (Truong 
2003c). The agenda of development ethics, on the human costs, options, 
‘trade-offs’ and human ‘write-offs’ in socio-economic development processes, 
ever more clearly applies not simply to events in a geographically separate 
South and its relations with a separated North, but to events and relations 
within the North too. We have a ‘Global South’, everywhere, partly as 
                                                 
3 The economic advance of large groups in the two population giants, China and 
India, may bring decline in measures of global inter-personal equality; but at the same 
time major groups have suffered absolute declines, in many cases into dismal penury, 
and the income ratios of global top groups (whether in New York or Mumbai) to 
global bottom groups (whether in Mumbai or New York) have grown dramatically. 
4 Bales (2003) presents the sex trades in Thailand as integral components of its 
development model. A ‘down market’ of virtual sex slavery caters to lower income 
workers who can now afford to regularly buy sexual services. An enormous ‘up 
market’ supplies sex for tourists: ‘nearly 5 million unaccompanied men visited 
Thailand in 1996. A significant proportion of these were sex tourists’ (Bales, p. 219). 
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migratory consequence of the era of a rich geographically separate North 
dominating a remote South, and more importantly from endogenous (re-) 
creation of a South in the North. The term ‘Global South’ conveys the 
transnational character of poverty and deprivation, and suggests a convergence 
of deprivation across geographical boundaries. Pierre Bourdieu wrote of the 
‘sans’: those without, the jobless, homeless, paperless. We find pockets of 
‘North’ everywhere now too. The world has become pre-1994 South Africa 
writ large. To an important extent, the fields of development studies and 
international political economy now merge (Hettne 1995). 
Development ethics’ typically strong focus on women (e.g., Nussbaum & 
Glover 1995; Sen 1999) grows. Strikingly many of the Voices of the Poor 
(Narayan et al. 2000) were women’s. Women are characteristically families’ 
‘shock absorbers’: they care for the ill and infirm, they enter forms of flexible 
or informal work when family pressures dictate, they are pressurized in times 
of change to embody purported tradition, they give others some security and 
comfort. Their own security and well-being are often in jeopardy, 
unconsidered, downgraded. Shock absorbers are noticed only when broken. 
Since the 1990s women have become the majority group in international 
migration for work, whether voluntarily, by coercion or through deception. 5 
Migration and vulnerability are however of general relevance and, for the sake 
of contrast, we open with an example that mainly concerned male migrants 
from economically booming China, deployed in an occupation that was 
dominated earlier by British women.6 
One night in February 2004, 21 foreign workers, nearly all of them young 
Chinese, drowned in Morecambe Bay, North England. They were harvesting 
cockles, a profitable shellfish, on the Bay’s notorious mudflats. Possibly they 
became ‘stuck in sucking sands as the tide came in, perhaps [they were] simply 
swept along in one of the deep channels that can suddenly open up in those 
sands’ (Thompson 2004). Fifteen fellow-workers were rescued. Reportedly, 
some who were stuck or stranded tried to call their families in China by mobile 
phone, to say farewell. They were not familiar with the emergency services 
telephone number in Britain. ‘There are warning signs about "quicksand and 
dangerous tides" near where they died, but they would not have understood 
them. They spoke no English.’ (Xinran 2004). Groups of Chinese workers had 
been saved from the winter sea by lifeboats twice in the previous five weeks. 
Subsequent investigations indicated that some of the workers were asylum 
seekers; others were illegal immigrants who had paid large sums to be 
smuggled into Britain. All lacked work permits and were controlled by Chinese 
‘gangmasters’, who could take up to half of the income from the cockle sales 
and who supplied the labour to an English boss who helped obtain the permits 
for cockle picking. The twentyone workers who died lived with twenty others 
in one small house. They would be taken to the sands at any time of day or 
night, dependent on the tides, to reap the unusual temporary abundance of 
                                                 
5 See International Organization for Migration (IOM) statistics. 
6 The British Countryside in Pictures, Library Edition, Odham Press Limited, London (no 
date) p. 318. 
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cockles. Local residents and the fishing community in Morecambe Bay had 
warned for months about the risks. 
These events, variously described, attracted much attention in Britain, 
China and worldwide. Whatever the exact details of the case were, it called 
forth questions about work and insecurity in the global market. Are people so 
reckless or so ignorant, so eager for gain, so desperate, or so misled by 
recruiters? In fact, nobody from the very poorest groups in China can afford 
the payment required for transportation and entry to the West; but the move 
leaves many migrants heavily in debt and with families in China to support. 
Once in Britain they appear willing or forced to risk their physical security in 
the hope of economic security and gain. Some of the workers who had been 
rescued in February soon returned to work on the mudflats. And two months 
later, for example, four cockle-pickers were rescued by lifeboat men after 
becoming stranded on the same sands.  
The risky search for financial gain in a worldwide field of operation is not 
new. What might be new is the intensity of reporting and reflection, thanks to 
modern communications technology; and perhaps, partly underlying the 
intensity, the degree of concern that can be seen in the reporting, with not only 
outcries at interlopers but in many cases both a lament over loss and a will to 
understand. In a piece in London’s Daily Telegraph (February 7, 2004) 
immediately after the deaths, Adam Thompson evoked a painting by JMW 
Turner from an earlier phase of outrage, the 1840s. It depicts the casting of 
dead and dying slaves into the Atlantic from slave ships in order to claim 
insurance by reporting that the slaves were lost in a storm rather than from 
sickness. Turner brought the case memorably to attention, but to an immensely 
smaller audience than that for modern electronic media. 
Later in the 19th century, millions of Chinese died in a series of famines. 
Over ten million died in the North China famine of the late 1870s alone, 
watched over by an enfeebled Imperial government long undermined by 
Western incursion. In stark contrast, the great North China drought of 1743-
44 had been effectively handled by vigorous government action, far more 
effectively than were comparable famines in Europe in 1740-43 (Davis 2001: 
280ff.). Famines of similarly enormous magnitude occurred repeatedly in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries in British-ruled India. Its population was as a 
result virtually stagnant between 1891 and 1921 and indeed stagnant between 
1871 and 1921 in many districts (Davis 2001: 175). Davis notes figures of 
twenty million excess deaths in India for the 1890s, and ten million excess 
deaths or more in each of the famines of 1876-9, 1896-7 and 1899-1902 (Davis 
2001: 110-11, 158, 174). As in the Irish famine of the 1840s, the British 
authorities consciously restricted and rejected remedial interventions in the 
face of weather-related crises. Little or nothing was done to secure the ability 
of the poorest groups to access food. The famines were recorded and reported 
in Europe and North America but as remote and alien events. They received 
far less attention than the dramatics of war and rebellion. Unlike the ‘Indian 
Mutiny’ or ‘The Boxer Rebellion’ they never entered the popular (or elite) 
Western memory. Only the insecurity of ruling groups was considered 
significant and noticed. Nowadays with incessant electronic media coverage, 
deaths in Darfur or Ethiopia may be experienced elsewhere as more manifest, 
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tangible, and urgent. Such events can though be largely ignored, as the loss of 
millions of lives in the Congo in the past decade testifies. Corpses on a winter 
night on Morecambe Beach may speak more vividly to Northern audiences.7  
Section 2 explores some key areas in globalization by using a gender 
perspective. This takes us beyond the abstracted circuits of economic 
production and the corresponding categories. It makes us centrally consider 
reproduction: biological, psychological, emotional. Otherwise, disjunctions in 
reasoning at policy level reinforce and exacerbate dysfunctions in social 
systems at local and global level, leading to tragedies at the personal level. A 
gender perspective may provide also some moral resources for responding to 
systemic tragedy, in addition to resources for identifying and understanding it. 
It brings to our attention the centrality of activities and attitudes of care, in 
various settings and forms. 
Global changes demand an ethic that honours and protects human dignity 
as a core value, and can extend itself beyond the particular form of govern 
mentality confined by the notions of sovereignty and territorial control. Ethical 
questions regarding human dignity can no longer be framed within neatly 
demarcated realms, such as the ‘domestic’ (read: self), and the ‘foreign’ (read: 
distant others). Self and Others intertwine in processes of production, 
reproduction and consumption. Socialisation by foreign au-pairs and domestic 
workers affects children growing up under paid domestic care (Baquedano-
López 2002). Withheld wages of commercial sex workers are laundered 
through international banking systems, or invested in real estate and 
transformed into immobile capital for further accumulation (O’Neill-Richard 
1999). The HIV/AIDS pandemic transmitted through uninformed or uncaring 
unsafe sex has caused an inter-generational transfer of burdens to AIDS 
orphans and social orphans. Vulnerable children become commodities fed into 
cross-national trafficking chains (Dottridge 2004). There now exist 
interconnected systems of vulnerability, for which corresponding systems of 
human security, care and responsibility are needed in order to ensure the 
protection of human dignity as a core value (Truong, 2006).  
Section 3 looks at responses in the evolution of thinking in development 
ethics. The gradual move beyond economism to ideas of human development 
is being deepened by drawing of connections to the human rights tradition and 
by the growth of a discourse of ‘human security’. This discourse represents a 
response to human insecurity: economic debacles in Africa, the former Soviet 
Union, Latin America and more briefly in East Asia, and numerous wars and 
their effects. Does it provide anything more than new packaging? We suggest 
yes: ‘human security’ is a return to the substantive agenda of basic human 
needs, but better grounded in an ethnography of the risks and pressures, hopes 
and fears, of ordinary lives rather than only an abstracted accounting of 
                                                 
7 The Tsunami disaster of December 2004 triggered exceptional sympathy and 
response in Europe. The involvement of large numbers of European tourists, 
combined with the near-universal nature of the event (who has not spent time on a 
beach? who cannot imagine a wall of water raging in?) and perhaps the post-Christmas 
lull in other news to generate enormous attention. This could not but notice the 
undeserved nature of the disaster, and the vigorous help by local authorities and 
residents to tourists and to each other. 
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deficiencies or an elevated language of opportunities. An ethic of human 
security and human development must be grounded not only in rich 
ethnography but be emotionally and existentially grounded too. These required 
forms of grounding are mutually supportive. 
Section 4 examines the potential contribution of three diverse bodies of 
thought to grounding such an ethic of human security and human 
development: the ancient tradition of Mahayana Buddhism; the current work 
of philosopher-anthropologist Ananta Giri; and feminist care ethics. Section 5 
summarizes and concludes concerning the trajectory and lessons for 
development ethics. Its work, especially on ‘human development’, has to treat 
development in a global perspective and to reflect on the content of ‘human’, 
including through careful attention to gender and to caring. 
2 GLOBALIZATION THROUGH A GENDER LENS 
Viewing globalization through the gender lens reveals the persistent 
obliteration of reproduction, the female sphere, in mainstream debates in 
international political economy (IPE).8 Susan Strange, a founding mother of 
the field, helped to redirect its focus from state-based to society-based (Palan 
1999). She identified four foundational societal structures – knowledge, 
security, production and finance – and argued that State power can be 
understood as an outcome of the articulation of elements in each structure, 
independently or in interaction. Reproduction – as a foundation of the human 
condition that maintains and makes the continuity of life and social institutions 
possible – remained implicit in her framework. Yet Strange held that the object 
of study of IPE is nothing less than the ‘human condition as it is, or was’ 
(Palan 1999: 126). 
To provide a more adequate account of the human condition and address 
the consequences of an androcentric construction of reality requires what 
Youngs calls an act of ontological revision: to get ‘behind the appearance and 
examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations 
that form that reality’ (Youngs 2004: 77).9 She delineates three levels of 
interrogation, concerning: why women and gender concerns are subsidiary in 
high politics and diplomacy; why the male subject position reigns in theorizing, 
despite its selective apprehension about the human condition; and whether 
these aspects reflect a deeper cultural current of masculinity itself, a 
phenomenon of power and consciousness historically formed and structured 
by the separation of public and private life (Youngs 2004: 77-80). 
                                                 
8 We consider gender to be a structure in a multilayered social reality, intersected by other 
structures such as class, ethnicity, religious affinity and generation. We use a three-fold concept 
of gender: a) as a property of individuals (male and female); b) as one principle that defines the 
boundaries and hierarchies of social organisations; and c) as a structure in conceptual systems 
that gives visibility and significance to the public sphere (the male representation), sidelines the 
private sphere (the female representation), and at certain points obliterates the continuum of 
interaction between the two. 
9 Ontology is used here to mean a perspective concerning what exists and the position 
of the ‘self’ in that reality. 
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Following her suggestions, let us look at characteristics of ‘globalization’ as 
a historical process – a process which has acquired features distinct from early 
forms of internationalisation. These include deterritorialization (the growing 
range of human activities that take place irrespective of the geographical 
location of participants in such activities), social interconnectedness (the ways 
in which activities in one locality can have impact on the social world of 
another), and velocity (the accelerated pace of human activity and rate of social 
change) (Scholte 2000, 2005). Our main questions are: Deterritorialisation, 
social interconnectedness and velocity relating to whom? To which human 
activities are we referring? 
What do these three key features of globalization mean to those located in 
the ‘Global South’? There is an increasing disparity of interests between those 
involved in the accelerated and perpetual mobility of capital (‘the men’ who 
control the corporate sector, including the women in masculine positions of 
power and authority) and those involved in the daily maintenance of firms, 
farms and families (‘the women’, including the men in feminized positions). As 
Beneria (1999) points out, ‘Davos Man’ provides the archetype of human 
activity in the mainstream account of globalization, displacing the 
representation of the quotidian reality shared by the two thirds of humanity in 
the Global South. The disparity has brought new boundaries in the global 
geography of wealth, deprivation and mobility, and rescaled political and 
economic relations within and between nations. In this new geography, the 
nation-state is simultaneously irrelevant to some social activities and 
omnipresent in others. 
Contemporary labour migration regimes illustrate this. Evidence on the 
licit and illicit involvement of migrant labourers (men, women, boys and girls) 
in sectors such as construction, agriculture, textiles, and tourism-related 
activities including sexualized entertainment and even begging (ILO 2001) 
reveals the dynamism in international and regional labour markets. These 
markets reflect structural changes and forces other than those in the welfare 
systems of industrialized countries.10 While labour markets increasingly acquire 
regional and international ramifications – interconnected by vast networks of 
labour recruitment using methods stretching from high-tech digital facilities 
down to personal persuasion at village levels – the legal regimes for labour 
migration still centre around assumptions of territorial integrity and cultural 
separation and difference.  
Industrialised countries report three service sectors with major labour 
shortages: health and care; education; and information technology (OECD 
2002). Shortage in the health and ‘care’ sectors results from an ageing 
population and the absence of substitutes for human labour. More broadly, we 
see a huge expansion of markets for personalized services, both in essential 
and luxury sectors. The proliferation of care services, such as body care, 
childcare, care for the elderly and the plethora of sexual services, feeds on and 
into a rapid and globalised transformation in social reproduction. Yet migrant 
                                                 
10 For example, reports from NGOs working for trafficked children in Africa show 
that an increase in the use of child labour seems to be correlated with the fall of world 
prices of commodities (coffee, cocoa) (Truong  2006). 
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labour in a variety of activities affiliated with the maintenance of human life is 
considered as insignificant – therefore unmonitored – and is supplied through 
irregular private means, sometimes with the tacit tolerance of state agents. 
These supply lines have come to form an area of international migration 
managed with little human rights protection (Truong 2003b; Chapkis 2003), 
mostly dominated by human trafficking regimes in which migrants are subject 
to gross violations of rights by unruly practices of underground organisations 
(Truong 2003a; Iselin 2002).11 Currently, regulatory regimes of migration for 
work consist of a combination of global, regional and bilateral regimes. 
Defined as the movement of natural persons, international migration is a 
category of trade in services regulated by the WTO-GATS Mode 4. This mode 
covers service suppliers at all skills levels. However, governments’ 
commitments have been largely restricted to the highly skilled male sectors 
(intra-corporate transfers, business visitors, contract suppliers). There exist 
isolated bilateral arrangements for labour gaps in formal sectors dominated by 
women, such as health and managed care. Some bilateral arrangements also 
cover sectors that lie at the nebulous junction between formal and informal, 
such as entertainment and domestic services.12 
The unwillingness of many governments to commit themselves to 
regulating the lower strata of the skill ladder reflects a preferential treatment of 
the male-dominated corporate sphere of work. The desire to protect the 
integrity of national borders remains entrenched, while the pressing need to 
protect those living in conflicting frameworks of jurisdiction, stripped of their 
capacity for control over their destiny, languishes in judicial disharmony. 
Patterns of ‘forum shopping’ have emerged – choices by trafficking networks 
of where to operate according to which judicial environment allows them to 
maximize returns and/or minimize risks – that constitute a direct challenge to 
state control (Europol 2000). As argued by Iselin (2002), unless states can 
create judicial harmony, allow joint investigation, and adopt workable and 
efficient national and international mechanisms of referencing that protect the 
human dignity of victims, migrant workers in ‘feminised’ conditions (of 
submission and obedience) will, irrespective of their gender identity and sector 
of employment, remain unable to assert themselves as subjects with rights. 
In these situations, high velocity as an aspect of globalization fails to apply 
to the judiciaries, bound as they are by so many considerations derived from 
history, culture, national identity and other interests. Despite a formal 
commitment by states to juridical protection of victims,13 the slow formation 
of functioning local institutions to provide this protection has buffeted many 
undocumented migrant workers into sidelines where they turn to criminal 
actors for protection – a protection that often transforms into tyranny. The 
                                                 
11 Belser (2005) estimates that global profits made from forced labourers exploited by 
private enterprises or agents reach US$ 44.3 billion every year, including US$ 31.6 
billion from trafficked victims. The largest profits - more than US$ 15 billion - are 
made from people trafficked and forced to work in industrialized countries. 
12 For example the arrangements between Japan and the Philippines for entertainment, 
and Hong Kong and the Philippines for domestic services. 
13 Under the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime and the protocol on 
the human rights protection of victims. 
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‘unpeople’, helots or undocumented and bonded migrant workers do not 
experience de-territorialization as active agents, but as highly dependent 
subjects. They move through distinct gendered and racialised corridors of the 
international labour market. They are deployed in stigmatized and risky 
locations with often little scope for agency.  
By contrast, within the sphere of conventional economic statistics the 
visibility of migrant workers’ contribution is now glaring. Their remittances (as 
citizens, denizens or helots) have become a key source in national finances, less 
volatile than other financial flows and relatively unaffected by financial crises 
(Ratha 2003). According to IOM (2003), remittances through official channels 
amounted to USD 72.3 billion in 2001 – double the amount in 1988, implying 
a growth rate between five and six per cent per year. Since a large number of 
migrants remit through informal channels, the total amount is much higher. 
According to the World Bank (2006: ix) international remittances received by 
developing countries in 2005were in the order of USD 167 billion. For many 
low-income countries remittances have become two to three times larger than 
foreign direct investment, and far exceed the volume of Official Development 
Assistance.  
Remittance is proportionately more important amongst the less educated 
migrants, who have a higher burden of parental and filial duty for the 
maintenance of the young and the elderly (IOM 2003). But precisely the least 
protected migrants remit through informal and risky financial channels, for 
undocumented and/or temporary migrants cannot open bank accounts. They 
turn to costly methods offered by private companies who charge between 13 
and 20 per cent of the amount transferred, or to informal channels where their 
money is at risk of theft (Ratha 2003). In a pyramid of social relations, new 
rules provide privileges and protection for workers affiliated with corporate 
activities but leave the subordinate groups subject to the unruly nature of the 
global polis, despite their major contribution to the economic security of their 
nations. 
The global economic reforms of the past generation, and current 
frameworks of analysis and policy negotiation, show great attention to 
economic productivity and little regard for human and social reproductivity. 
Norms built into global governance frameworks on liberalisation of financial 
markets and migration have produced, in many contexts, distinct spheres of 
gendered interests. The transformation of production as a key structure in 
international political economy has not entailed a transformation of 
consciousness to address the security and financial concerns of those who are 
daily engaged in the maintenance of human life and social institutions without 
which the production and financial investment would be impossible.  
A reproductive crisis manifests itself in anarchical patterns of 
unauthorised, illicit and concealed movements of people across borders in 
search of work under conditions of high risk in order to be able to sustain 
them selves and the livelihoods of those left behind. This crisis, a tragedy for 
very many, has opened up a new space for ethical reflection and for debates on 
how to foster progressive forces for a more equitable transformation.  
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3 DEVELOPMENT ETHICS 
From economism to human development to human security  
Theories and practices 
Development ethics as a field is a space of analysis and action regarding the 
trajectory of societies, with special reference to suffering, injustice and 
exclusion within societies and between societies at a global scale. (See e.g. 
Gasper 2004 for other characterizations.) Its typical focus on humans in their 
own right, irrespective of location, rather than as abstract functioning factors in 
an economy, offers the possibility for a politics of social change that accepts 
human dignity as a priority.  
The development ethics field can be seen as the intersection of various 
streams of practice and traditions of theorizing. Figure 1 presents some major 
bodies of practice in which ethical issues have been perceived and grappled 
with, at least sometimes, and how they intersect with important streams of 
theorizing, thereby generating many types of thought and action. The matrix 
shown is a tool to think actively about work in development ethics, not a 
facsimile portrait. There are of course overlaps between the streams and 
traditions presented; but professional ethics, for example, has become a 
distinct field of theory, as part of practical ethics’ theorizing and advice in 
response to real choices. Further, the matrix lacks a time dimension, to convey 
say the rise of human rights in policy terms. Other areas of practice, such as 
consumption or inter-cultural relations, and of theory, such as consumer 
theory and critique, or cultural theory and critique, could be added. Arguably 
we could, for example, add environment as a practice column and participatory 
approaches as both a row and a column.  
In this paper we stress some sources which are not prominent in past 
work but whose importance in development ethics is growing: feminist theory 
and practices in struggles for gender equity; and migration as a social reality 
from which many ethical questions emanate and are being scrutinized in the 
same way that emergency relief and intervention have been and continue to be. 
We will in addition propose to extend beyond disembedded moral philosophy 
and spirituality and to draw from existentialist thought and from ethics of care. 
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FIGURE 1  
Some sources and streams in development ethics.  
Examples of the resulting work. 
SOME SOURCES IN PRACTICE  
Socio-
economic 
development 
policy, 
programs, 
projects 
Human rights 
activism and 
practice 
Emergency 
relief, 
conflict 
and 
humanitarian 
intervention 
The world of 
work and 
corporate 
responsibility 
Critiques of 
mainstream 
economics 
Sen & capability 
approach. 
Haq & ‘Human 
Development’. 
Grameen Bank. 
 
‘Rights-based 
approaches’ to 
development 
(not led by HR 
theory) 
The 
entitlements 
approach to 
famine and 
hunger 
‘Triple bottom-
line’ 
Well-being 
research 
Participatory 
poverty 
assessment. 
Ellerman on 
building 
autonomy via 
assistance 
Galtung, Max-
Neef et al. on 
autonomy and 
participation in 
one’s community 
Harrell-Bond 
on promoting 
autonomy in 
relief 
programs 
De Moraes, 
Carmen, on 
autonomy in work 
Moral 
philosophy 
Nussbaum’s 
capabilities 
approach. 
O’Neill’s 
approach to 
justice 
Rights of 
women, children, 
workers, aged, 
handicapped, 
animals 
Kantian 
ethics of 
obligations;  
Red Cross 
[Western moral 
philosophy has 
been very largely 
too abstract to 
distinctively 
contribute here] 
Religions 
Liberation 
theology; 
Buddhist 
economics, 
Sarvodaya  
 
Liberation 
theology; 
Gandhianism; 
socially engaged 
Buddhism 
Christian 
relief 
agencies; 
Red 
Crescent 
Catholic social 
thought. 
Vedantic 
business ethics; 
‘faith-
based…’;SEWA 
Humanism 
Goulet, Berger, 
Illich, Max-Neef 
Universal 
Declaration of 
Human Rights 
Oxfam relief 
MSF 
UN Global 
Compact 
Human 
rights 
theory, juris-
prudence 
Right to work. 
Basic income. 
Rights of the 
displaced. 
Human rights 
covenants; work 
on legal 
constitutions, 
legislation; 
judicial activism  
Doctrines of 
(non-) 
intervention 
Labour rights. 
Child labour. 
UN Protocol on 
Human 
Trafficking 
(2000) 
Professional
/ practical 
ethics 
Immersion 
visits; 
professional 
guidelines and 
codes of 
practice 
Work to apply 
formally avowed 
rights in practice  
Codes of 
relief ethics;  
SPHERE 
standards 
Business 
practice codes; 
social 
entrepreneurship 
 
Feminist 
theory 
Discerning 
gender-based 
social injustice. 
Gender audits. 
Unveiling of the 
care sector.  
Complementing 
rights with 
virtues and care. 
Demanding 
rights for 
invisible workers 
and subjects in 
need of care. 
Rape as a 
war crime 
and a 
component 
of genocide 
(UN 
Resolution, 
2008)  
Organizing in the 
informal 
economy; 
Domestic 
Workers 
Associations.  
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Human development 
Much of the literature in development ethics has arisen in the italicized cells in 
Figure 1, where some schools in moral philosophy and social science, including 
critiques of mainstream economics, address issues arising in socio-economic 
development policies, programmes and projects. This work is diverse, since the 
schools are diverse – utilitarian, Aristotelian, Kantian, existentialist and more –
but a major thrust is captured by the subtitle of a recent survey: ‘From 
Economism to Human Development’ (Gasper 2004). The leading single 
theoretician in such work has probably been Amartya Sen. Of key importance 
was his association with an inspiring and influential practitioner Mahbub ul 
Haq, founder of the UNDP Human Development Reports and of the wider 
human development movement in development analysis and advocacy. The 
work led by Haq, Sen and UNDP can be broadly called the Human 
Development Approach. It has achieved, rather rapidly, a significant degree of 
institutionalization, in national and sub-national as well as international 
reporting.  
Human development (HD) thinking has broadened the range of objectives 
that are routinely considered in development debate and planning. Some other 
aspects of the HD approach are less obvious and require comment. They 
include both strengths and lacunae. 
First, Haq led a rejection of partitioned thinking: the analysis of processes 
and connections only within conventional disciplinary and national boundaries 
and thus within the supposedly largely separate containers of national 
‘economies’. He emphatically espoused and embodied ‘joined-up thinking’ not 
hobbled by those boundaries.  
Second, quietly included without much philosophical trumpeting, the HD 
approach (HDA) also takes a step towards ‘joined-up feeling’. As in pure 
utilitarian or human rights philosophy, the field of reference is all humans, 
wheresoever in the world. Unlike in market-based economics, the field is not 
reduced to agents with purchasing power, let alone weighted according to their 
purchasing power. Global ethics then automatically starts to arise as a topic of 
attention, as we see for example in UNDP’s work on global public goods. 
Third, the focus on individuals does not make HDA neo-liberal. Neo-
liberalism views the human being through a narrow lens, as an individual 
economic actor who should be placed in a levelled ‘playing field’ for 
competition. HDA endorses a broader spectrum of meanings with regard to 
‘being human’, seeing people as social, cultural, economic and political 
subjects. Humanism implies a view of the self as socially embedded and 
influenced, but not as purely socially determined. While HDA requires and 
employs such a view it has not elaborated it far, except perhaps in the 
contributions of Martha Nussbaum. Later we discuss this lacuna further. 
Lastly, a number of criticisms have been made of the conceptualization 
adopted in the UNDP Human Development work which is largely based on 
Sen’s capability approach to welfare evaluation (see e.g.: Apthorpe 1997; 
Truong 1997; Cameron & Gasper eds. 2000; Gasper 2002). While seeking to 
move beyond mainstream economics, Sen and Haq aimed to bring most of its 
practitioners with them. The capability approach still bears then many of the 
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features of economics discourse which other disciplines and audiences can find 
problematic. For example: 
• The overgeneralized style of the slogan ‘Development is the expansion 
of human capabilities’ brings a danger that thinking can be displaced by 
counting. We must ask: capabilities for which persons? which 
capabilities, why and to what end? Sen’s later slogan ‘Development as 
freedom’ provokes similar questions (Gasper and van Staveren 2003). 
Nussbaum’s work probes deeper here (e.g., Nussbaum 2003, 2006).  
• In contrast to the human rights tradition, HDA did not establish 
guarantees for individuals, despite its serious concern for equity. 
Nussbaum’s work, focused on constitutional anchoring of basic rights, 
has faced this issue, and the HDA has moved towards an 
accommodation with work on human rights (UNDP 2000). It remains 
worried though about human rights formulations as absolutist and as too 
focused on the state (e.g., CHS 2003: 28). 
• Why should one care about individuals and particular capabilities? HDA 
presumes rather than builds a motivational basis. So in fact does much of 
the human rights tradition, but that more readily connects to some 
motivating factors. A minority of HDA writers, such as Nussbaum, have 
attended explicitly to emotions and motivation. (See also Sen 2002.) 
Recent work seeks to reduce these limitations and deepen the Human 
Development approach – as by clarifying relationships of human development 
to human rights and to culture (WCCD 1995; UNDP 2004; Gasper 2007) – 
and to extend it to cover crucial related areas, notably of human security. Haq 
warned against a possible fossilization of HDA that could be induced by its 
extraordinarily rapid institutionalization. He urged ongoing criticism and 
innovation, and himself led the work on human security in the 1993 and 1994 
HDRs. Subsequently, Sen has been at the forefront of extension and 
innovation, including as co-chair of the report Human Security Now (CHS 
2003).  
The lens of human security 
The newer discourse of ‘human security’ addresses both the question of 
guarantees for individuals, in sometimes a more flexible and probing way than 
in most human rights discourse, and the need for a motivational basis, 
including by providing a foundational rationale for human rights in terms of 
basic capabilities which concern areas of basic need. It thus complements the 
established but sometimes partly honorific or stultified discourse of human 
rights (Penz 2001), and complements and extends the discourse of human 
development in a number of ways (Truong 2005b; Gasper 2005a, 2008a).  
Methodologically and in policy outline, the approach appears the same. 
We see again the insistence on being empirical and tracking real connections 
between economy, polity and society, now including the worlds of war, and 
drawing the implications: joined-up thinking. For example: ‘What is needed is 
not large amounts of additional financial capacity within the state but more 
efficient integration of social policy objectives into macroeconomic and trade-
related policy processes’ (CHS 2003: 87); ‘Costa Rica, Sri Lanka and the Indian 
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state of Kerala have managed very effective social protection systems on the 
same budget as other regions that offered no such protections’ (CHS 2003: 89). 
Haq brought militarism’s opportunity costs as well as its direct costs to the 
centre of the stage, and estimates like the following have become 
commonplace: ‘The World Bank and the United Nations estimate that if four 
days’ worth of the annual military expenditure worldwide were diverted into 
education every year, that would provide the funding needed to achieve 
worldwide primary education by 2015’ (CHS 2003: 117-8). Feminist theory 
goes on to explore militarism’s cultural impacts and consequent other effects.  
So what if anything does the human security discourse add? First, most 
obviously, it concerns itself with the stability and security of people’s 
capabilities (seen as the real opportunities of achievement which are open to 
them and which they have good reason to value), not only their average level. 
Secondly, it has a more substantive character: less generalized and abstracted, a 
language of the concrete needs of concrete individuals. A concern with 
securing starts with a concern for basics, specific goods: securing life and 
health and dignity and peace. The very label human security, initiated to draw a 
contrast with the security of states, makes us think about what is human, what 
is the humanity that should be secured. It better grounds the existing human 
development discourse -- in the mud, as Manfred Max-Neef would insist, and 
directs us towards the quotidian, the most vulnerable and their plural systems 
of protection. Thirdly, this substantive focus on basics gives the discourse a 
stronger existential charge, a more vivid and touching content, a firmer 
motivational base. It goes further towards ‘joined-up feeling’ in addition to 
‘joined-up thinking’. Thus Penz (2001) diagnoses it as a fuller move in a 
cosmopolitan direction. In these last two respects it is close in character to 
Nussbaum’s form of human development theory, but with a more limited 
focus: on the basics. 
Listen to one of the presidents (Carazo) of Costa Rica who built its 
welfare state:  
I knew the Costa Rica of social injustice: a country of people without shoes or 
teeth, without [a] university, with scarcely half a dozen high schools … It was a 
Costa Rica without a limit of working hours, in which children also worked as 
grown ups; … [where] life expectancy was barely more than 40 years. I saw the 
sick ask for hospital attention as charity … Workers had no vacations, no 
dismissal notice, no severance pay  ….  A Costa Rica without social guarantees. 
(Cited by Mora 2000, p.24.) 
The country of people without teeth, two generations ago, now has higher life 
expectancy figures than the USA. The MDGs are not yet about helping people 
have teeth, as a basic need, but they are in that same spirit. 
These evocations from the notion ‘human security’ survive, and in fact 
grow out of, the vagueness and pluriformity of the notion in current usage. A 
variety of meanings is employed, and appears legitimate and important. 
Evocativeness and richness of content are not inherent mistakes in ethical 
concepts, but they also bring dangers of confusion and of drift. We must 
distinguish for example between socio-economic security and psychological 
security. The two are not always closely related. Psychological security can be 
obtained in various ways besides socio-economic security, some of which are 
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admirable, some undesirable. Psychological security via a belief in a simple 
‘true’ personal identity, typically from membership in some inspiring group, 
carries dangers, and can be at the cost of openness and humanity to those 
outside the group (see e.g. Glover 2001). 
Human Security Now’s policy agenda includes attention to the formation of 
such basic perceptions, and to more cosmopolitan education that can ‘teach 
students to reason, to consider ethical claims, to understand and work with 
such fundamental ideas as human rights, human diversity and interdependence 
… to grasp the reality of human interdependence more directly and more 
widely… [and] instill in the content of education a new emphasis on ethical 
values – and on public debate and democracy’ (CHS 2003: 122). Education 
concerns adults not only children, including ‘the police, the armed forces, 
private security forces and others with access to the means of coercive force’ 
(loc. cit.: 122). It should include gender awareness, conflict management, and 
opening up of perceptions of identity, to see oneself as having multiple 
identities (p. 123). The last of the main recommendations is to strengthen 
activities for ‘Clarifying the need for a global human identity’ (pp. 141-2).   
The challenges to development ethics  
So, something important has happened in the attention to development ethics 
in the past fifteen years: more at the level of literature and theorizing; much 
less so, yet with some significant achievements, in the worlds of policy, 
education, and action – for example concerning debt, child labour, the greater 
centrality officially granted to human rights, and so on. Whether the changes 
outside the world of words are judged encouraging or not depends on what 
one takes as the basis for comparison and evaluation. More should have 
happened, but at least something did.  
Why have some favourable moves occurred, and why not more? The 
move from words to policy action to institutionalized daily practices is an 
enormous journey. What did not yet happen are the required gradual paradigm 
shifts at all levels, from abstract reasoning through to institutions and daily 
practices. Historically, major change has often been measured in centuries 
rather than generations (Krznaric 2007). One hopes that velocity and 
deterritorialization will grow at the same rate in ethics as they have in many 
other respects, to keep pace with interconnectedness.  
The speed of the journey is affected also by the insightfulness and 
methods of the travellers, including how well they converse with those with 
whom they must work and influence. The preoccupation with theory, in the 
revival since the 1970s of academic political philosophy and substantive ethics 
triggered by John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971), may have brought 
insufficient explicit attention to motives and feelings. Rawls incorporated 
moral intuition into his method, but did not interrogate and educate it. In the 
thought experiment that he used to render plausible his theory of justice, the 
imaginary ‘original position’, he sought to incorporate intuitions about fairness 
into the design of the original position and then rely further only on 
calculations of self-interest. This appears neither a consistent approach nor one 
that explores sufficiently the emotional building blocks of ethics.  
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Where do the intuitions about fairness come from? What if they are 
absent? Jonathan Glover cites Thucydides’ account of the negotiations 
between the militarily dominant Athenians and the city of Melos in the 
Peloponnesian War. The Athenians, from their position of strength, listened to 
and rejected every plea from the Melians made on grounds of fairness, 
sympathy, compassion or rights. They insisted on Melian subordination in 
place of neutrality, besieged the city, massacred its male inhabitants of military 
age when it surrendered, and sold the women and children as slaves (Glover 
2001: 28-30). Writing at the same time as British imperialism presided with 
Olympian indifference over mega-famines in India, Nietzsche commended the 
Athenians’ stance to the aspirants to world-power in late 19th century 
Bismarckian Germany. The viewpoint remains widespread, bedecked 
sometimes in the philosophical vestments of ‘realism’. Indeed, Rawls explicitly 
limited his theory of justice to relationships within modern Western liberal 
polities, and rejected its application elsewhere, including to relationships 
between polities. The development ethics implications of his position are both 
limited and, in a globalized world, obsolescent.  
Without a starting point of concern, care and motivation, development 
ethics in particular will have little impetus. Both Sen’s work on human 
development and official human rights discourse may rely on motives which 
they fail to highlight, discuss, and consolidate. A human rights language is 
anyway insufficient, and must be complemented by the acceptance of duties 
and the presence and practice of ‘virtues’, appropriate ethical attitudes and 
skills (O’Neill 1996). These have a base in fundamental human capacities and 
proclivities for reflection, empathy and compassion (Truong 2005a). We saw 
that Human Security Now gives substantial attention to education towards a 
global human identity. We we will see too that some authors on human 
development ethics such as Giri and Nussbaum seek to fill more general 
lacunae in HDA by drawing from other traditions in moral philosophy, 
spirituality, and social theory. We will refer in particular to feminist care ethics, 
a modern strand within the family of those ethics which stress virtues.  
Nothing may be more practical than a good theory, but what are the 
factors which contribute to the perceived power of a theory, especially in social 
philosophy and public policy? Rawls’s theory achieved impact not only through 
its elaborate reasoning but because it could tap and also tacitly educate 
widespread ethical intuitions in his chosen audience. Sen’s work has achieved 
similar or greater impact, including far beyond academe, partly because of his 
adoption of a more morally evocative vocabulary – of entitlements, 
functionings, capabilities, agency, freedoms and human development – than in 
the existing economics of welfare and policy. Drawing from studies of what 
types of ideas acquire authority and influence in policy-oriented science and 
successfully bridge the worlds of science and policy, Asuncion St. Clair (2006) 
argues that successful intellectual ‘boundary objects’ in the emergence of ethics 
in development theory and policy are those which have had a strong ethical 
‘charge’ and that connect well to feelings and intuitions. She posits that ‘human 
security’ can be an effective boundary object (see also Gasper 2005a). 
Work on ‘human security’ has been with us already for over a decade. 
Arguably, for the work to reach more of the parts that most development 
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ethics has so far failed to influence, it must consciously employ methods with 
emotional depth, such as life narratives and intimate studies of life spheres, 
methods from the arts and humanities. In parallel, it and development ethics 
more broadly have to widen their theoretical attention to cover emotions and 
motivations, as is done in the literature on an ethics of care. In other words, 
work on human security requires a methodological broadening, to add to its 
broadened scope in terms of themes and sectors.  
The need for experientially and emotionally grounded ethics  
Early modern social theory in Europe emerged during the 17th and 18th 
centuries in the transition from an era riven by immense inter-religious 
European conflicts to a world dominated by economic forces and inter-State 
competition for global prizes. David Hume expressed his relief to live in the 
18th century not its bloody predecessor. He and thinkers like Bernard 
Mandeville and Adam Smith advocated strong reliance on a market system, as 
supposedly guided by and in turn fostering more peace- and progress-giving 
motives, ‘the Interests’ as opposed to the volatile ‘Passions’ which fuel war 
(Hirschman 1977). Smith argued that, if properly institutionally channelled, 
self-interest is the most reliable way to build both prosperity and peace. But 
while the passions can be extremely destructive, it would be deeply erroneous 
to think that all passions are undesirable and dispensable, or that cooperation 
and mutual help are dispassionate. Smith himself gave enormous weight to the 
role of ‘the moral sentiments’ which sustain human society, including market 
functioning. Others took over his analysis of the first world-wide web, the 
market system, and presumed that only the amoral sentiments, the desires for 
material gain and personal convenience, were necessary for its effective, indeed 
socially optimal, operation. Strangely, some of their present-day successors 
even try to analyse violent conflicts exclusively as dispassionate struggles for 
gain.  
Ananta Giri’s remarkable Conversations and Transformations (2002) argues 
persuasively that social ethics requires deeper pictures of self and of how selves 
relate with others; attention to how reasoning, reasonable, compassionate 
selves are fostered; and empirical study of how committed, sympathetic 
reasoning can be embodied and sustained in social practices and styles of 
ethical argumentation, notably in the various spheres of ‘civil society’. In effect, 
he considers the social contexts for moral self-development and action. He 
reflects on the roles of case studies and biographies, noting Gandhi’s insight 
that people impervious to reasons may still be susceptible to influence via their 
capacity for sympathy; or as formulated by Bhikhu Parekh, that unless there is 
already sympathetic attention to a person she will be ignored or downgraded in 
reasoning. Giri therefore proposes that development ethics should draw on the 
tradition of self-cultivation found in ‘aesthetic ethics’ but must also avoid the 
possible associated narcissism, by strengthening its own tradition of facing 
suffering others. 
Giri argues that Sen’s conceptualization of human well-being rests on an 
inadequate conception of personhood and lacks a dynamic perspective on self 
development. ‘Sympathy’, said Sen in mid-career, is when a person’s own well-
being is affected by the situation of other persons; ‘commitment’ is when a 
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person acts in support of other persons or other causes even though this does 
not improve his/her own well-being. Evidently by ‘well-being’ Sen here meant 
felt well-being, gratification. His definition of the label ‘sympathy’ (feeling with 
others) as gratification from another person’s well-being implies that this 
gratification is the only possible sort of feeling-with-others, and implies that 
non-gratification types of feelings towards others require a different name (he 
chose ‘commitment’). Giri prefers the ordinary usages of ‘sympathy’, as feeling 
with others, and of ‘commitment’, as dedication to others. Hence like Adam 
Smith he stresses that, in these senses, sympathy sustains commitment rather 
than the two being mutually exclusive categories as for Sen. Nor are they 
marginal: mental health requires some degree of orientation to other people. 
Sen has famously proposed that democracy prevents famines, in contrast 
to the malign neglect practiced by the Imperial British authorities in 19th 
century India or Ireland. Case studies of contemporary India show that while 
formal political democracy mitigates famine, in reality it does not prevent it 
(Banik 2007; Currie 2000). Underlying Sen’s hypothesis is an optimistic vision 
in which democracy increases not only (1) the flow of information, but also (2) 
the respectful and sympathetic awareness of others and (3) the willingness to 
contribute to help them, at least if other relevant people share in doing so 
(‘collective altruism’ – Penz 1986: 202-210; Dreze & Sen 2002). Unfortunately 
democracy at national level does not guarantee any of these three, at national 
or even subnational level; let alone guarantee respect, sympathy and solidarity 
on a global level. Within the United States, as in India, formal democracy co-
exists continually with the destitution and malnutrition of large groups of 
people. And at global level there is not even formal democracy.  
Giri brings in a richer picture of human personality than Sen has used, and 
this leads to a profound critique. He proposes that Sen’s capability approach 
does not focus on personal growth, nor on the ability to be a friend not enemy 
to oneself, nor on the nature, as opposed to only the idea, of human agency, 
nor on the development of ‘a space for criticism of the self-justificatory claims 
of one’s freedom’ (p. 210). The approach ‘[does] not embody striving for self-
development on the part of the poor… [and] lacks an objective of self-
actualization or self-realization’ or self-extension (p. 230). ‘Sen is dismayed by 
the unreasoned identity shifts that are taking place [in India] but the reasoned 
deliberation that Sen is looking for requires much more than reason’ (p. 239). 
His ethics remains too much in the mould of Rawls, lacking an adequate 
psychological basis. Giri contends similarly that Habermas’s discourse ethics 
does not attend to ‘the preparation of the self that is required to take part in 
the public sphere’ (p. 302), including the arts of listening and openness to 
‘otherness’ that are required for true conversation, nor the enriching role of 
love which Giri illustrates from the years of intense debate between Gandhi 
and Rabindranath Tagore. 
Richard Sennett’s recent study of respect (Sennett 2004) perhaps carries 
further warnings for Sen’s variant of human development theory. At least we 
must distinguish carefully between types of attitude towards others. In 
Sennett’s view, opportunity and compassion make an unhappy marriage: 
opportunity brings inequality, and ‘creaming off’ of the brightest of the 
poor(er), while ‘compassion wounds’ as Mary Douglas declared, and is anyway 
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undermined by inequality. Compassion easily deforms, in circumstances of 
inequality, into pity and becomes experienced by receivers as contempt. 
Receivers typically share Mary Wollstonecraft’s perception that ‘It is justice, 
not charity, that is wanting in the world’. For the poorer, not only the poorest, 
‘compassion condescends, meritocracy excludes’. Building self-respect amongst 
the poor by meritocracy is no solution, for this rapidly brings creaming-off. 
The required response to the inevitable inequality of capitalism, suggests 
Sennett, should not be for the state to (further) promote meritocracy and 
opportunity, but to guarantee access to basic needs; for example via a basic 
income, not via conditional handouts monitored as part of the ‘audit society’ 
(Power 1997).  
Two more warnings arise. First, fulfilment of basic needs ensures 
opportunity; but a key question is by how many stages of opportunity 
(opportunity to have an opportunity to have an opportunity…) one is removed 
from centrally important goods. The guarantee is hollow if the stages are too 
many. A danger exists that the language of providing opportunities can be used 
to disguise their absence for most people. 
Second, basic needs provision requires continuing commitment and is not 
a substitute for it. Costa Rica has recently had two ex-Presidents charged with 
corruption and at the same time a third who prudently resided abroad. Tatiana 
Mora (2000) reports a growing mental distancing of its affluent urban groups 
from the expanding urban underclass, growing feelings that the poor, while 
indeed multiply deprived, are in one way or another outside society -- weird, 
contrary, and not susceptible to help or not deserving of help: ‘not one of us’. 
Fighting human development deficits requires human development policies 
and investments which should be cost-effective, plus a conducive macro-
environment, economic and political (no waste and no war). But it also 
centrally requires ethical commitment: recognition of other people as fellow 
humans. 
From the 1991 Human Development Report, Mahbub ul Haq highlighted the 
lack of political commitment, rather than lack of resources, seen in many low-
income countries, as shown by how national budgets are allocated (Haq 1999: 
178). Haq’s legacy, the Millennium Development Goals, are a tool in trying to 
generate political commitment. By focusing on the real basics, for ‘the people 
without teeth’, the MDGs have captured attention including the attention of at 
least some of the mentally distanced elites. They provide in addition a yardstick 
by which leaders will be judged, and against which if there is seen to be failure 
there could well be reaction. But targets alone are unlikely to be self-fulfilling in 
this way. Also required for MDG implementation is an ethical and perceptual 
strategy. 
Such issues become harder still in international relations. The goodwill 
that is feasible, even presumable, between family and friends, and to some 
degree within a local community and to a lesser extent a nation, becomes yet 
thinner; many nations lack solidarity. Here too Haq and like-minded 
progressives made important steps, by demonstrating how aid budgets are 
actually allocated and could be reallocated, and by obtaining rich governments’ 
commitment to the MDGs. However such targets are not self-implementing.  
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Section 4 looks therefore at caring and its role in moral thought: in a 
generalized way, in familial and local contexts, and with some reference to 
authors who discuss what types of extension or supplementation may be 
possible in the global arena.  
4 THE LENS OF CARING  
We present now three somewhat complementary streams which offer a social 
treatment of the self and its interface with ethics and politics. First, the ancient 
Mahayana Buddhist tradition offers a theory of compassion and systemic 
transformation through the transformation of human consciousness. Second, 
the work of Ananta Giri links such concerns to those of development ethics, 
which requires an ethic of development of the self, to enrich the human 
development approach. Since the historical record suggests the limits to 
projects of individual improvement, these must be inserted into a project of 
the construction of civil society -- local, national and global. Third, feminist 
care ethics offers strong insights which are beginning to be extended to face 
issues of care beyond the household or local community. We consider the 
three strreams as different manifestations of a shared yearning for the 
protection of human dignity and the facilitation of human flourishing. In terms 
of Figure 1’s survey of development ethics, their sources are from the rows for 
moral philosophy, religions, and feminist theory. 
Buddhism 
The Buddhist queries any claim to independence embodied in the notion of ‘to 
be’, seeing it as arrogant, and seeks to honour a diversity of forms of 
interdependence and inter-being, meaning the mutual relevance of all life 
forms and events in the social world. She/he does not reject justice as a 
universal principle, but considers justice as subordinate to compassionate 
understanding (prajna). Unlike some of his/her Kantian or feminist 
counterparts, the Buddhist subject does not place justice and care in mutual 
opposition, but seeks constitutional balance of the individual self and of the 
social body. She/he uses meditation techniques as a worldly tool for ego-
reduction, not as escape (Truong 2005a).  
Buddhist thought may be apprehended through the principle of non-
duality, backed by the Buddha’s deliberations (sutras) on knowledge and 
spiritual wisdom. The principle derives from a bio-centric approach to human 
life, nature and the cosmos. Buddhist thought defines humans as organisms 
that are interlinked with other organisms. The human being differs from other 
organisms in nature owing to the endowment of mind14, the essential quality of 
which is formed by the recognition of this interdependency and expresses itself 
in different forms known as empathy or ‘interbeing’ (Thich Nhat Hanh 1993). 
Organically embedded in nature, the individual self is subject to impermanence 
                                                 
14 An introduction to Buddhist theory of mind and its meeting point with the field of 
psychology is best found in the conversation between H.H. the Dalai Lama and 
Howard Culter (1998). 
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and the cycle of life and hence she/he requires care and is capable of caring as 
an intuitive response. What can come between self and others are 
unwholesome minds, not the specific biological traits of the self or the other.  
Prajna, or penetrating insight, is the ability to understand nonduality, the 
inter-being of all forms of life. This insight has the capacity to transform 
individual and collective memories of trauma and sufferings into a release of 
compassion. Prajna stands for the image of a fountain from which compassion 
as a non-violent life force emerges. To tap the fountain requires mind training. 
This can help achieve a transformative shift of consciousness to attain what are 
referred to as the four abodes – caring and friendliness (maitri), empathy with 
those who suffer (karuna), sympathetic joy for others without envy (mudita), 
and equanimity or constitutional balance (uppeka). A change of perception 
through prajna leads to a change of emotional structure (from hostility to caring 
and friendliness), a change of attitude (from anger to empathy), a change of 
behaviour (from desiring to take, to a willingness to give; from readiness to 
cause grief, to willingness to bring joy), and a change away from being diverted 
by ‘unwholesome mind’, towards maintaining the constitutional balance of 
nonduality. By applying the practices of the ‘four abodes’ or virtues, the 
individual can achieve moral clarity. Moral clarity enables an understanding of 
interconnectedness as a phenomenon that lies deeper than the societal level, a 
clarity that facilitates the acceptance of all differences as manifestations of a 
universal process in which all human beings are parts.  
Knowledge produced by a bio-centric approach to human life, nature and 
the cosmos is neither anthropocentric nor egocentric. It seeks to apprehend 
the interconnection between human life and other organisms. Wholesome 
knowledge comprehends this interconnection. Unwholesome knowledge 
perceives myopically. Buddhist ontology provides a vision of human nature 
embedded in a bio-centric world view. Organically embedded in the universe, 
mind is capable both of drowning in conceptual errors or liberating itself from 
these. Liberating the mind can lead to the capacity for generosity and 
appreciation of other persons’ universes. The will of mind (determination) in 
Buddhism is not geared towards power and control, but towards 
understanding the nature of interconnectedness, which is considered the key to 
release empathy and compassion. Ontological security is not derived from the 
notion of a fixed stable self, whether socially or morally defined. It is derived 
from the ethical ideal to perceive oneself in relation to others and, indeed, as 
others (Adams 2002). 
Placed in the context of modern theory of care, the Buddhist notion of 
care for the self may be understood as the fostering, attaining and maintaining 
of constitutional balance; with the expectation that care for others then 
follows, based on the moral clarity achieved. The values of care in Buddhism as 
represented by the four abodes are applicable to anyone in the community; and 
achieving constitutional balance and moral clarity, in varying degrees of depth, 
are the responsibility of everyone in the community. Social injustice is seen as a 
manifestation of a collective psychological failure, a misperception of the self 
and inability to see interdependence as a reality and to appreciate the 
immeasurable virtue of the four abodes.  
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Ananta Giri and a non-narcissistic ethics of self-development 
Giri adds modern social theory to such concerns with perception and 
misperception. He proposes that ‘Development is a field of relationship’, 
between persons. The broadening of concerns in development policy, as seen 
in Sen’s work, ‘has lacked a parallel effort to deepen it’ (2002: 200), in terms of 
agents’ motivation and skills. ‘…the agents of development have not given 
much attention to developing themselves’ (loc. cit.), their personalities and 
empathy, their ability to listen and co-operate. In contrast, as Bill Cooke has 
noted, the established caring professions insist on years of training and testing 
before their junior professionals are given power over clients and patients. 
Professional ethics are needed to strengthen a sense of servanthood in the 
powerful and privileged. Ethics must build a committed ethos, not merely 
proclaim sets of rules. In fact, professional ethics should critique self-
concerned, irresponsible, ‘professional’ identities, and drop the old model of 
the professional as master. Giri advocates here a model of service and of 
existential, not necessarily geographical, pilgrimage. 
This step is central: ‘without emphasizing self-transformation we cannot 
adequately address either the problem of distributive justice or institutional 
well-being’, let alone the issue highlighted by Nancy Fraser of justice as 
recognition (Giri 2002: 262). The work of development agents can be greatly 
strengthened by, and even requires, extension of the self, including extension 
of their sympathies and ability to ‘listen for a change’ (Hugo Slim’s phrase). 
‘…self-development is also equally a challenge for the [intended/purported] 
beneficiaries of development’; the poor must ‘become responsible for their 
destiny’ (p. 200). In India, for example, extension of the self is an essential step 
in bursting the barriers of caste. ‘…aesthetics of self-cultivation challenges 
both the poor as well as the rich’ (p. 217). 
Development of the self leads us towards the agenda of ‘aesthetic ethics’: 
self-cultivation, self-transformation, and Foucault’s ‘elaboration of one’s own 
life as a personal work of art’ fit for admiration by oneself and others. In caring 
for the self, people can easily be influenced by their feelings of superiority, 
insecurity and resentment. An aesthetic ethics has potentials for egoism, vanity 
and narcissism; and despite its celebration of ‘difference’ and otherness, ‘the 
radical otherness that poverty poses has been deliberately relegated to the 
background’ (Giri 2002: 201). An aesthetic stance need not be aestheticist, 
however; we can have attention to both self and other. Self-fulfilment in fact 
requires deep and non-repressive commitments to others. Thus Giri’s 
exemplars are Kierkegaard, Aurobindo and, interestingly, Adam Smith, rather 
than Foucault, for they provide a deeper ontology of the self and its potentials. 
The premise of 18th century Scottish Enlightenment thinking on civil 
society was that mutual sympathy is a quasi-universal feature in human nature, 
providing ‘a basis for human interaction beyond the calculus of pure exchange’ 
(Adam Seligman, quoted by Giri 2002: 287), but that it needs to be promoted 
and defended. Thinking of India and elsewhere (and also of universities), Giri 
extends this notion:  
‘the challenge before us is to rethink civil society and transcend the primacy of 
the political [and the fixation on the State] in thinking about it and being part of 
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it. Those who inhabit civil society are not only rights-bearing, juridical beings but 
are also spiritually integral beings, and unless civil society is animated and 
enriched by their sadhana of self-transformation and the tapashya of 
unconditional ethical obligation of the self to the other and society, then it can 
not perform its creative and critical functions. It shall cease to be a reflective 
space where the logic of money and power of society is shown its proper place 
and given a transformative direction’ (2002: 289).  
Civil society should be seen not only as the realm of rights-bearing individuals 
who organize to discipline the state, and the market; but also as the seed-bed 
for the ‘cultivation of virtues in the lives of individuals’ (p.290). It requires 
inspiring figures ready to be martyred to ‘protect the autonomy of civil society 
and the dignity of individuals’ (p.304). It also requires more routine and widely 
accessible schools for the virtues. He accepts the view of Claus Offe that 
schemes such as LETS (local trading schemes that use their own alternative-
currency) cannot function directly as tools for societal transformation but have 
valuable roles in training as well as in societal damage limitation. They can help 
to build mutual awareness, including awareness that nobody deserves all his 
advantages (or disadvantages) and that we exist only through others.  
Civil society in multi-cultural nations must become inter-cultural, ‘a 
learning society where different cultures and individuals are open to learning 
from each other’ (Giri 2002: 325). Identity should then be seen, as Paul 
Ricoeur suggests, as narrative identity: ‘not only as a matter of a priori 
formulation and categorical determination; it is also an aspect of an unfolding 
narrative’ (p.327), an ongoing identity formation or ‘identification’. Giri’s 
current work extends this focus to the construction of global civil society, with 
specific reference to the movements for an alternative globalization. 
Feminist ethics of care 
Our third source, feminist care ethics, offers the richest mix of ethnography, 
social theory, ontology and moral reflection. It presents a multi-fold vision of 
care: first, as a moral orientation, disposition, and emotion; second, as a set of 
skills and understandings; third, as a social practice found in a variety of 
significant relations such as mothering, friendship, nursing, and citizenship; 
and lastly, as a socio-economic system jointly managed by private and public 
actors, which faces many dangers including paternalism and corruption 
(Tronto 1994; Sevenhuijsen 1998). A care system spans, or should span, 
various sectors, including the traditional caring professions such as nursing, 
social work and schooling; humanitarian relief; and the business sectors, in 
employment regimes and corporate outreach (Razavi, 2007).  
Different feminist care ethicists bridge the divide between personal and 
political in different ways. Some claim the existence of a gender structure in 
morality, and claim the superiority or equivalence of the ethic of care arising 
from women’s social roles as the feminine principle – which they find 
obliterated in masculine moral deliberations (e.g. Gilligan 1982). Others reject 
this claim, as its confines women’s moral capability to self-erasure and 
abnegation and as lacking autonomy of agency (Clement 1996). They seek to 
revise the notion of autonomy by removing it from abstract reasoning and 
ideal types and develop a social approach to care and autonomy, private and 
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public, as dialectically linked. Noddings (2003) for example defends the ethic 
of care as based on personal relationships, but draws out important 
implications for public concerns (such as social supervision of managed care 
systems like hospitals, day-care centres, homes for the elderly). To her, caring 
as a practice requires personal encounters. Therefore, beyond the defence of 
managed care systems to prevent their deterioration by public decisions, care 
practices must be guided by situated ethics requiring reference to contextual 
details as well as to general principles of forms of caring (Parton 2003; Keller, 
1996).  
Although there is consensus on the definition of the self as socially 
situated, interpersonally bonded and sexually and racially embodied, there 
seems to be no common feminist position on the relation between this self and 
social change wider than the contexts of industrialised nations. With some 
exceptions (e.g. Ehrenreich & Hochschild 2003; Tronto, 2003; Yeates, 2004), 
the care debate misses an international perspective that can show how 
changing forms of care in one country may affect the social world of care in 
another – as in the case of migrant workers in paid domestic services, bilateral 
arrangements for the migration of nurses, health tourism and outsourcing of 
health services. Technological innovations, market forces and cultural shifts 
create massive change in this international arena. An ethic of care should 
contribute to reining in market behaviour and re-directing technological 
research to serve humanity and not just specific groups of monied humans. 
Building this contribution requires an enlarged definition of vulnerability and 
moral orientation. Compassionate evaluation of merit remains an insufficient 
force for transformation. Care as a moral orientation for global social justice 
must understand the sufferings of those who are denied care as not only a 
discrete tragedy of persons and groups, but as outcome of systemic forces 
which sustain the functioning of care systems for richer others.  
To identify the systemic forces that undermine care systems within and 
between countries and to respond in a holistic manner, the strategy adopted by 
Sevenhuijsen (1998), Folbre (2001), Tronto (2003) and Williams (2003) may be 
useful. The strategy seeks to integrate the values derived from the ethics of 
care (attentiveness, responsiveness and responsibility) into concepts of 
citizenship: to enrich the concept of citizenship, based on a more holistic 
notion of the self in which reason, judgement and care co-exist, interrogate 
each other and find resolutions to specific and contextual contradictions. To 
use the values of care as political virtues to interrogate performance in 
particular contexts may help to alter systems of values and concepts in service 
of democracy in all dimensions of life.  
Connecting streams 
None of the three positions above has, as yet, strongly developed attention to 
international relations, but each has potential. Of great interest for this task are 
also, first, Martha Nussbaum’s work, which spans investigation of the 
emotions, ethical motivations and practices of care, through to an emergent 
cosmopolitan global ethic for an ever more joined-up world; and the very 
different but potentially complementary work of Onora O’Neill, that locates 
the role of ethical virtues within a reasoned framework of the duties that we 
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owe others in a system of interdependence. Since Nussbaum and O’Neill’s 
work is widely and intensively discussed, in this paper we have concentrated on 
sources that are equally interesting but less considered in development ethics. 
Feminist ethics in particular appears to be pregnant with ideas relevant for a 
wider stage. 
Aware of the risk of reducing nuanced, rich traditions to a sterilized 
presentation of similarities and differences, we yet see the merit in comparing 
diverse traditions for mutual appreciation and possible synthesis. Competing 
views on human agency, the body, and moral formation of the self may 
however have to be reconciled. 
At the most general level, a view shared by the traditions is of the self as 
an encumbered rather than unencumbered subject, which we can refer to as 
embedded humanism. Feminist theory on care, vulnerability and women’s 
agency grounds the notion of autonomy in real life conditions, as do Sen and 
Nussbaum’s theories of human capabilities and functionings. Mahayana 
Buddhist moral theory on compassion and karmic consequences defines the 
self as organically embedded in nature and the cosmos, and encumbered by the 
pain of birth, illness, old age and death. It is not fully socially determined but 
certainly moulded by cultural socialisation.  
Sharing such a view of the self, the traditions then take different routes in 
reasoning. Each captures something important. ‘Vertical reasoning’ – 
emphasizing norms, principles for human capabilities and functionings – is 
found especially in Nussbaum’s work, whose deliberations suggest the position 
of a legislator and a decision-maker in the public sphere where ideas gain their 
legitimacy, policy options are chosen and resources are mobilized.  
‘Horizontal reasoning’ stressing historicity, process and context is 
characteristic of early feminist writing on ethics of care. The ethical subject in 
this line of reasoning is the mother and the community builder who 
interrogates the legitimacy of regnant ideas and norms in the public sphere and 
demands public attention to everyday survival problems and the maintenance 
of life. ‘Spiral reasoning’ stresses the chain of causation of suffering and 
deprivation, starting with a view on the illusion of the self as a uniform entity, 
and appeals to the use of methods of mind discipline (meditation) to discover 
diverse levels of interconnectedness (mind-body; self-other; public-private; 
local-global) and achieve moral clarity for change. It is characteristic in 
Mahayana Buddhism. Rather than interrogating others, this tradition 
interrogates the self, the notion of ‘to be’ and the tragedy of the human failure 
to recognize the significance of to inter-be. The Buddhist ethical subject is a 
healer and adviser on practices of mindful living as a way of healing social 
systems.  
In an era where human relationships have gone transnational, the values 
of the ethics of care must be applied on a transnational scale to foster a 
political agency that can extend itself beyond the particular form of 
governmentality confined by the notions of sovereignty and territorial control. 
As Sevenhuijzen pointed out, care structures human relationships and makes 
them possible, and how we can care defines to a great extent how we can give 
shape to our society. She suggested the term ‘caring solidarity’ to convey the 
notions of attentiveness, responsiveness and responsibility to all sort of 
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situations in which care is required by human beings who are differently 
situated. She writes: ‘This “caring solidarity” offers more potential for 
understanding the diversity of needs and lifestyles than a solidarity which takes 
for granted the norms of homogeneity and a “standard” human subject. In this 
respect, care marks the difference between policy as control and policy as an 
enabling activity’ (Sevenhuijzen 1998: 147-8).  
In Sevenhuijzen’s view, the feminist ethics of care, a politics of needs-
interpretation and a caring solidarity could be integrated into a reflexive and 
dialogic form of discourse ethics. Treating ethics as ‘enabling discourses’ may 
help us to address human rights, human development and human security 
issues in a more situated fashion. Such an approach would allow for ethical 
judgement of experiences and locations in ways that recognize what 
Sevenhuijzen refers to as ‘situated rights’, and therefore can enable public 
provision that is derived from the principle of universality of rights yet meets 
the standards of what is required in a given situation, place and time. Applied 
creatively, feminist ethics of care may contribute to resolving contested issues 
regarding universality, universalism and particularism, and may contribute to 
fostering interconnected systems of human security relevant to the quotidian 
experience of the most vulnerable people.  
As the global public domain is stratified, conflictive and dominated by 
interests that are hegemonic and defined according to reigning notions of 
nation-state and communities, building a caring solidarity at this level would 
inevitably encounter what Yuval-Davis refers to as the politics of belonging 
(2003). Drawing from her empirical work on identity politics, she endorses 
Crowley’s concept of ‘belonging’ as being thicker than that of citizenship, 
covering not just notions of membership, rights and duties but also the 
emotions that such membership evokes. In her view, belonging is where the 
sociology of emotions interfaces with the sociology of power, where 
identification and participation collude. For human security to be possible and 
a caring solidarity to be active, the sense of belonging and the emotions 
attached to it must be re-oriented beyond the particularities of states or 
communities, to foster a spiritual understanding of the human condition that 
goes beyond the temporal and partial boundaries of communities.  
5 CONCLUSION: GLOBALIZED SENSIBILITY? 
GLOBALIZED SECURITY?  
Development ethics as a field of thought focuses both on the overall 
trajectories of human communities and on the lifepaths of the individuals who 
constitute and span those communities. Its agenda increases in urgency in the 
face of globalization’s vast and varied impacts worldwide, which render some 
groups of people highly vulnerable. Notably many impacts are on women, as 
‘shock absorbers’, custodians of the private and reproductive spheres 
downgraded in business calculation and mainstream economics. Our focus has 
been on the ‘shock absorbers’, specifically on those without security. 
The fact of such impacts is not new, though some of the modalities may 
be. In the recurrent ‘Third World Holocausts’ of the mid 19th to early 20th 
century, which Mike Davis has helped to recover from oblivion, tens of 
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millions of poor people perished. They were victims of a historical phase 
marked, as Sen noted, by: the extension globally of market forces and 
ideologies, backed by direct rule or indirect imperial policing; second, the 
related decay of local capacities to assure subsistence in times of need; and 
third, the absence as yet of new national capacities to take on these roles. Such 
capacities grew in the second half of the 20th century, under most post-
colonial governments. In late century and at the start of the new millennium 
we have seen new holocausts as global market forces outstrip, undermine and 
bypass national governments; classes of new helots emerge to serve the rich; 
some national social compacts that existed for assurance of subsistence have 
declined; and parts of the globe even fall into the abyss, as happened in the 
Congo and pockets of West Africa. While some of these holocausts pass 
unnoticed (by the rich) into the night, there are signs of increased global 
concern within the global electronic village. The tsunami of December 2004 is 
not the best indicator since, besides its visual drama, many Western tourists 
were involved. More striking for our purposes is a case like the Morecambe 
Bay drownings, where Chinese workers in search of better lives ended theirs as 
throw-away inputs in a value-chain in Europe and thus attracted more 
attention than they ever did in their lifetimes. 
We now require, and are unevenly moving towards, a global frame and 
global ethics, comparable to the earlier begun emergence of national systems of 
rights and responsibilities. Will this emergent global framework be one where 
might makes right and the universal principles are those of market (and other) 
power, or will it be based on principles of universal human dignity and 
fundamental human rights? (Held 2004; Gasper 2005b).  
The paper looked at the responses in development ethics in relation to 
these practical and intellectual challenges raised by attention to human security 
and gender. We proposed that, besides elaboration of detached theory, or 
drafting of conventions, more attention is needed to the emotional, perceptual 
and existential grounding of ethics. The Human Development approach 
(HDA) has a number of gaps to be filled. It has, as a great strength, 
substantially put aside economics-dominated frameworks and attempts instead 
‘joined-up thinking’: transdisciplinary integrative analysis of ‘development’.15 It 
remains much weaker with respect to ‘human’. The approach’s previous lack of 
basic guarantees for everyone is being remedied by connection to the human 
rights stream and in the recent reformulations of ‘human security’; but it lacks 
a sufficient analytical base concerning the nature of personhood, selfhood, 
identity, and mutual concern, and a considered motivational basis for such 
concern. It implies a humanist view of the self, but many of its exponents have 
perhaps not realized that it needs to articulate and elaborate such a view, and to 
consider how compassionate committed selves could emerge. It presumes and 
conduces to ethical universalism, ‘joined-up feeling’, but needs a more 
emphatic and profound basis for this. (Martha Nussbaum’s work is an 
exception in these respects, but has an outlier role within the HDA; Gasper 
                                                 
15 The Journal of Human Development, founded in 2000, still chose the subtitle Alternative 
Economics in Action. In 2007 it finally replaced this with ‘A Multi-Disciplinary Journal 
for People-Centred Development’. 
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2003.) We suggested that Sen’s picture of the impact of democracy per se is 
too rosy; and saw Sennett’s warning of the incoherence and instability of a 
system based on opportunity and presumed compassion alone. The less 
generalized, less abstract focus in the work on ‘human security’, on securing 
basic needs, supports concern and motivation, but is still not enough. Its 
language is at risk of being hijacked by the psychological insecurities of the 
rich. The poor too can seek psychic security in dismaying ways.  
We presented three contrasting but probably complementary exemplars of 
more profound attention to the self and to caring, as important illustrative 
sources: from an ancient religion, from a modern anthropologist-philosopher, 
and from a stream of feminist investigation. All three sources go beyond the 
sort of humane economics found in the United Nations mainstream of ‘human 
development’. Buddhism’s bio-centric vision of non-duality and inter-being 
questions the concept of self presumed in economics. Ananta Giri argues that 
self-development is the indispensable partner to notions of human 
development and societal development, and that civil society must be a nursery 
of the virtues. Feminist care theorists provide a major synthesis of observation 
and social, psychological and ethical theorization. While not offering an 
evolved, let alone unified, position on international issues their work suggests 
that global justice requires a conception of caring, a ‘caring solidarity’, to 
complement a systemic vision; that while compassion alone does not suffice, it 
is indispensable. For dispassionately reasoned global citizenship faces a more 
heady competitor, the politics of group belonging. Global justice may require a 
countering notion of global belonging, such as hinted at in human rights 
thought or as more grandly essayed by Buddhism.   
We conclude that the field of development ethics needs to be deepened in 
several directions to better serve those adversely affected by processes of 
globalization.  
• Development ethics should enrich its conception of the human being. 
Vulnerability and capability are two sides of the same coin of being 
human. Care connects both sides, and should be considered as a virtue 
to be developed for democracy, solidarity and social justice to be 
possible. 
• Development ethics should enrich its notions of well-being, including by 
drawing from the gender-sensitive study of care and routine life 
maintenance.  
• Bringing in the ethics of care may help to renew and reshape moral 
responsibility and reciprocity between persons as citizens within a state 
and between citizens of different states. This reshaping could be guided 
by the concept of belonging that incorporates notions of membership 
and community and the emotions that these notions evoke. Emphasising 
the interconnected nature of belonging, and empathy as a basic human 
emotion, may help redirect the politics of belonging beyond current 
territorial and temporal social confines.  
• By this and other means, development ethics should respond to the 
reality that human processes, and persons, have escaped from national 
 32
containers. An end to the perceptual and therefore moral blindness 
regarding inter-state care provision is called for.  
As Hershock points out, ‘tragedy lies at the intersection between the positive 
moral space of what ought to happen and the negative space of what could not 
happen’ (2003: 24). Ethical and other reflection is sorely needed to reduce that 
negative space.  
In arguing for a development ethics with a global perspective, grounded in 
rich ethnography and grounded emotionally and existentially, we in effect call 
for a revival in substantial part of the agenda mapped and pursued by Denis 
Goulet since the 1960s.16 Such work is needed to complement the ‘Sen wave’ 
of the last twenty years. Such an enriched and situated development ethics 
could contribute to the deepening of the body of social knowledge on 
globalization and the extension of forms of cosmopolitan judgement and 
political agency.  
                                                 
16 See Goulet (1971), Gasper (2008b). 
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